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AGENTS AND MANAGERS: CALIFORNIA'S
SPLIT PERSONALITY
Bruce C. Fishelman, Esq. t
INTRODUCTION
In 1924, French poet and writer Paul Val6ry combined the insight
of a social scientist with obvious humor when he wrote, "A man alone is
in bad company."' In 1991, a California commentator might as easily
remark that, "An entertainer alone is in the unemployment line."
Success in the contemporary entertainment industry requires the ef-
forts of a combination of specialized cohorts. The successful artist's ca-
reer must include a talent agent. A personal manager is likely to be
involved, especially if the artist is a musician. Attorneys frequently pro-
vide the services of a personal manager in addition to providing typical
legal services. Most successful Hollywood careers will also involve a
business manager, an accountant and a publicist.2
California law has failed so far in its efforts to adequately define,
distinguish between, and differentially regulate the specific roles of the
two most critical associations that a creative artist makes: the talent
agent and the personal manager. Given the practical and economic im-
portance of these two professions, and given California's prominent role
in the international entertainment industry, its regulation of these profes-
sions should be a model for the country. Unfortunately, despite its con-
trary claim,3 current California law is totally deficient in regulating
personal managers and others who periodically may be within the techni-
© Copyright, January, 1991
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1. D. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 477 (1983).
2. Johnson & Lang, The Personal Manager in the California Entertainment Industry, 52
S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 380-82 (1979).
3. See CALIFORNIA ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
LEGISLATURE OF 1985, Executive Summary, at 3 (1985) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]
claiming, "[t]he Commission believes that if the amendments to the Talent Agencies Act rec-
ommended in the report are made a part of the Act by statute, the Talent Agencies Act of
California will, in pursuance to the legislative mandate to the Commission, become a model
statute of its kind in the United States." Id.
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cal application of the Talent Agencies Act, as amended.'
California's current flawed regulation of talent agents and personal
managers has evolved from a series of legislative acts and revisions over
the last seventy-five years, which stem from the regulation of employ-
ment agencies in general. However, neither talent agents nor personal
managers have ever played a role that is adequately described as an "em-
ployment agency." Under present California law and current industry
regulations, personal managers are like film characters caught in a time
warp; they must be confused about the applicable law. This confusion is
compounded by the risk of having the manager's valuable investments of
time and money wiped out by unpredictable and ambivalent administra-
tive decisions, most of which are not published or widely distributed ex-
cept in limited and incomplete materials distributed at seminars held for
and by lawyers.
California has created a "split personality" in its regulation of
agents and managers. The potential for unfair and inequitable results is
manifest. Its laws must be rewritten, particularly as they apply to per-
sonal managers, in order to create an integrated regulation of these un-
sung artificers of the vast success experienced by the performers,
entertainers, writers, musicians and other creative artists.
An integrated and more equitabl: regulation of talent agents and
personal managers has been prevented by, inter alia, the talent agents'
desire to prevent unfair competition; the personal managers' efforts to
avoid statutory or union limitations on commissions and other activities;
and legislative and committee difficulties in finding satisfactory and prac-
tical definitions for critical phrases, such as managers' "incidental"
efforts to secure employment for entertainers or their "casual conversa-
tions" concerning the suitability of particular roles for entertainers. 5
These difficulties, although daunting, must be resolved if California is to
fulfill its mandate to provide a model statute for the regulation of talent
agents and personal managers.
THE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF AGENTS AND
MANAGERS IN CALIFORNIA
A quick search through California's statutes might lead one to con-
clude that the talent agent is the only professional whose activities on
4. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1990).
5. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-12. See also Lane, Fees or Famine: Could
California's Personal Managers Survive Regulation? 19 J. oF ARTS MGMT. & L. (1990); N. Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 170-174 (McKinney 1990); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 37.01(3)
(McKinney 1990).
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behalf of entertainers is regulated. It would seem that the personal man-
agement profession is unregulated except for the application of general
law. Although a professional category known as "Artists' Manager" did
exist, and was explicitly regulated, that category was merged with the
category "Talent Agent" in 1978.6 Despite the obviously significant dif-
ferences between talent agents and personal managers, no other refer-
ences to personal managers are made in California's regulations of
persons involved in providing employment for, or advice and counsel of,
entertainers.
Personal managers play an extraordinary role in California's en-
tertainment business. The fact that personal managers are not explicitly
referred to in the regulatory statutes does not mean that the profession is
totally unregulated. To the contrary, it is clear that the Talent Agencies
Act has provided an effective framework by which the California Labor
Commissioner has, following hearing, voided commission arrangements
between performers and others (usually personal managers) who failed to
obtain a talent agency license.7 In many of these cases, the managers
have even been denied the right to reimbursement for out-of-pocket ex-
penses. Los Angeles is the headquarters of the Conference of Personal
Managers, Inc., an industry organization concerned with the regulatory
power of the California Labor Commissioner.'
The absence of explicit references to personal managers in current
California law is the result of a series of political, legislative, and commit-
tee compromises that continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's. How
and why these compromises were reached is best explained by a brief
review of the history of the Talent Agencies Act.
The history of regulating talent agents in California stems from the
beginning of the twentieth century. At that time, there were concerns
about improprieties in booking and presenting vaudeville and live per-
formances. Entertainment booking agents had institutionalized unscru-
pulous relationships in formal fee-sharing (kickback) arrangements with
theatre owners and operators.9 The agents thereby diverted the fees ac-
6. 1978 CAL. STAT. 1382.
7. Copies of many of the decisions issued by the California Labor Commissioner are in
the possession of the Association of Talent Agents ("ATA"). The ATA, headquartered in Los
Angeles, is a trade association consisting of approximately 150 companies engaged in the talent
agency business. The materials at the ATA library and other essential information were made
available for the preparation of this article through the courtesy of the ATA and its executive
director, Chester L. Migden.
8. Telephone interview with Milton B. Suchin, President of the Conference of Personal
Managers, Inc. (Dec. 19, 1990).
9. Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 376-77 n.13.
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tually paid for the performers. Other employment practices in the en-
tertainment field also caused concern. Of particular concern were
prostitution and the protection of minors in the industry. These
problems, combined with general concern for the welfare of minors and
the improvement of working conditions, led to the legislative enactment
of a law applicable to all "Employment Agencies" operating in the State.
Included within the scope of the law were people who obtained work for
entertainers and vaudeville performers. A separate category of employ-
ment providers, denominated "Theatrical Employment Agencies," was
defined and regulated for the first time.1° All employment agencies, in-
cluding the newly recognized theatrical employment agencies, were li-
censed and regulated in the same manner.
In 1913, disputes involving all employment agencies - not just The-
atrical Employment Agencies - came under the administrative author-
ity of the Bureau of Labor Statistics."I In 1923, jurisdiction of disputes
involving agents was given to the California Labor Commission.' 2 This
law provided that dissatisfied parties had a right to demand a trial de
novo upon a hearing's conclusion.1
3
In 1937, California enacted its comprehensive Labor Code.' 4 In the
three decades between the first regulation of talent agents in 1913 and the
enactment of the Labor Code, very little innovation in the regulation of
talent agencies was evident. The 1937 Code refined the definition of a
theatrical agent somewhat and, reflecting the emergence of a new tech-
nology, added the category of "Motion Picture Employment Agency."'"
In all other substantial respects, the new law was mere recodification of
existing regulations.
At the time the Labor Code was enacted, the personal manager was
not yet a potent force in the entertainment industry. Even the talent
agency business was a much weaker force in the entertainment industry
than it has since become. The popularity of films had begun to displace
live theater and vaudeville as a primary source of industry income. The
so-called "studio system" had developed throughout the 1920's and
1930's, with its hallmark multi-year contracts (often seven years, includ-
ing options) for all important creative talent, from cameramen to stars.' 6
The studio system had made the talent agents' job somewhat perfunc-
10. 1913 CAL. STAT. 282.
11. Id.
12. See Lane, supra note 5, at 6-7.
13. Id.
14. 1937 CAL. STAT. 90.
15. Id.
16. Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 377 n.15.
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tory, since the studios controlled the talent and, once the deal was made,
the agent collected a commission for a lengthy period of time.
By the end of the 1930's, the studio system waned. The power of the
studios particularly declined following the second World War, due to the
widespread exploitation of radio and the development of television.17
The increasing unavailability of long-term studio contracts changed the
talent agents' role and challenged their income base.1 8 Short-term em-
ployment contracts became more prevalent with the studios. Independ-
ent and alternative production companies began to appear as competitive
employers of creative talent. Under these circumstances, talent agents
had to successfully negotiate many more deals in order to maintain their
income base. As the industry complexion changed and career choices
increased, talent agents became increasingly active in providing advice
and counsel to performers. Consequently, the provision of "advice and
counsel" has become the essence of the personal manager's contribution
to the entertainment industry.
Arbitration clauses in contracts between agents and performers were
first upheld in 1939.19 This method of handling disputes has taken on
increased importance, particularly since union and franchise agreements
often require such arbitration. In addition, the latest revisions to the Tal-
ent Agencies Act have specifically provided for the elimination of the
Labor Commissioner's hearings, as long as the Commissioner is provided
20proper notice.
In 1943, the term Artists' Manager appeared in the California stat-
utes for the first time.2' Under the 1943 Act, an Artists' Manager was a
person who engaged in "the occupation of advising, counseling, or di-
recting artists.., and who procures ... or attempts to procure employ-
ment."' 22 The term Artists' Manager, with its conjunctive definition,
differentiated these agents from others in the regulation of Employment
Agencies. The 1943 Act contained four recognized and regulated catego-
ries: the Artists' Manager; the Theatrical Employment Agent; the Mo-
tion Picture Employment Agent; and the general Employment Agent.
Only the Artists' Manager advised, counseled, and directed artists.
23
The legislature passed the Artists' Managers Act in 1959, but the
renaming of the regulatory legislation did not change much of the sub-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Lane, supra note 5, at 7.
20. 1986 CAL. STAT. 488.
21. 1943 CAL. STAT. 329.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 385.
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stance of the law. The 1959 Act preserved the substance of the regula-
tions promulgated in the 1913 Act, and reflected few of the practical
changes in the entertainment industry.24
In 1967, much of California's Labor Code was repealed. Distinc-
tions between the people who earned their living procuring employment
generally and those who concentrated on the entertainment industry
were more clearly recognized. The regulation of general Employment
Agencies was transferred from the Labor Code into the Business and
Professions Code. Subsequently, the regulation of general Employment
Agencies was removed to the Civil Code.25
Under the 1967 Labor Code revisions, the categories of Theatrical
Employment Agencies and Motion Picture Employment Agencies were
deleted. The Artists' Manager category was the sole regulated party, and
the substance of the prior regulations was continued.2 6 Thus, the Artists'
Manager became the catch-all category that included anyone engaged in
the occupation of procuring employment for creative artists.
The 1967 law still did not recognize differences between the job of
the talent agent and that of the personal manager. To members of the
public and to those involved in the entertainment industry, the differ-
ences between those two roles were becoming more obvious. Agents con-
centrated on booking, while managers focused on investments of time
and money in the process of long-term career building. Although these
distinctions emerged in the 1940's, it was the advent of rock 'n' roll and
the accompanying revolution in the music industry that made the dis-
tinctions crystal clear. Rock musicians often had a hard time getting
work through normal booking channels. These artists were frequently
backed by business supporters or non-band members who helped engi-
neer or "manage" their success.
In addition to revisions to the California Labor Code, 1967 also
brought a judicial landmark that furthered the involvement of the Labor
Commissioner in disputes involving personal managers and artists. As a
result of this decision, the two professions were brought into closer regu-
latory proximity, regardless of industry distinctions and realities. Buch-
wald v. Superior Court27 was the outgrowth of a dispute between
members of a rock band and their manager.28 The manager commenced
24. See Lane, supra note 5, at 7.
25. See 1967 CAL. STAT. 1505 (regarding former sections of the Bus. & PROF. CODE).
26. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 385.
27. 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
28. Id. at 351, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
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contractual arbitration to resolve the dispute.2 9 The band filed a petition
with the Labor Commissioner disclaiming their contracts, and claiming
that their manager was actually procuring employment without the re-
quired state license.3" The Court of Appeal for California's First District
decided that the Labor Commissioner had original jurisdiction since the
band members presented a prima facie case that the manager's activities
were governed by the employment act.31 After the Buchwald decision,
the Labor Commissioner unquestionably had original jurisdiction to de-
cide whether the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement could deter-
mine controversies between artists who used standard claims of
employment procurement activities in order to disclaim a manager's con-
tractual entitlements.
By 1975, the California Legislature again grappled with revising reg-
ulations for people involved in procuring employment for creative artists.
The Musician Booking Agency Act ("1975 Act") was created by the leg-
islature in order to regulate the new breed of managers associated pri-
marily with musicians. 32 The 1975 Act applied both to persons who
advised musical artists in their professional careers and those who en-
gaged in activities related to procuring employment for musicians.
The Musician Booking Agency Act was unpopular with all seg-
ments of the California entertainment industry. The bill was criticized
for having "vague and ambiguous" definitions. Critics found its terms
sufficiently broad as to apply to many other unintended parties who
worked on behalf of musicians. The 1975 Act required, for the first time,
the licensing of personal managers, and prevented them from engaging in
activities that conflicted with the interests of their clients. Since many
personal managers are deeply involved in the career development of their
artists, they are also frequently involved as principals in many of the
correlative contracts, such as independent production, recording, and
publishing agreements. These aspects of the 1975 Act were, therefore,
anathema to managers.
Legislative hearings were commenced in recognition of the wide-
spread industry opposition to the 1975 Act. As a result of this opposi-
tion, the 1975 Act was repealed without ever becoming effective.33
Three years later, still trying to grapple with the pleas of the com-
peting political and economic forces, the California Legislature passed
29. Id. at 352, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 360, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
32. Whetmore Musician Booking Agency Act, 1975 CAL. STAT. 1236.
33. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 385-86. See also Lane, supra note 5, at 8.
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the Talent Agencies Act of 1978 ("1978 Act" or "Talent Agencies
Act").34 This act formally repealed the 1975 Act but failed to answer the
fundamental challenge presented by the dilemma that the 1975 Act had
at least attempted to address. The essential problem was that the en-
tertainment industry had naturally developed a well-defined role - and,
in the music business, a dominant role - for the personal manager. The
manager was not a talent agent, who handled dozens, hundreds or
thousands of clients, as the larger talent agencies did. Nonetheless, the
manager was intimately involved in booking work for the relatively few
artists with whom the manager had agreements. Therefore, depending
upon how the language of the statutory regulation was construed, the
manager was continually acting in jeopardy. The 1978 legislation even-
tually avoided this problem.
In its original form, the 1978 Act required the separate licensing of
personal managers without regard to the employment solicitation issue.
However, the ensuing political fight and the agitation that surrounded
the 1975 Act led to the elimination of this portion of the proposed law.
Instead, the legislature eliminated the title "Artists' Manager" and re-
placed it with the title "Talent Agent." Otherwise, little of the substance
of the prior act - which, it should be recalled, had basically originated
sixty-five years earlier in 1913 - was changed. In so doing, the legisla-
ture gave further comfort to the confusion created by commingled
regulation.
With a vote of the legislature, the term "manager" disappeared from
the regulatory scheme. This legislative hocus-pocus only further obfus-
cated the underlying problem. The bold, if somewhat misdirected, 1975
and 1978 efforts to regulate managers were swept under the statutory
rug. Managers, among others, may have believed this was a victory,
since restrictive regulation and licensing were nominally avoided.
This was a Pyrrhic victory: a legal "twilight zone" was created at
excessive cost to many managers. Continuing challenges by artists to
their agreements with personal managers frequently resulted in a total
loss before the Labor Commissioner's hearing officers. With the titular
reformation of Artists' Managers into Talent Agents, but no further sig-
nificant expression of legislative intent or definitional advice to the ad-
ministrative executives, the legislature de facto encouraged the Labor
Commissioner and his designees to boldly exercise aggressive jurisdiction
over these disputes. During this period, many of the Commissioner's de-
cisions voided commission agreements ab initio between artists and man-
34. 1978 CAL. STAT. 1382.
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agers. These decisions often required detailed accountings and
disallowed counterclaims, even for reimbursement of substantial out-of-
pocket expenses. Such decisions ordered the managers, who routinely
were found to be acting as "unlicensed talent agents," to return "all mon-
ies, commissions, royalties or things of value received . . . directly or
indirectly" from the artist's activities.3 5
Despite the twilight zone regulation that continually presented a
risk of running afoul of the Talent Agencies Act, personal managers con-
tinued to gain prominence and importance in the entertainment industry.
It became more common for managers to assist performers' careers
outside the music field. This challenge to the historical province domi-
nated by talent agents created greater tension between personal managers
and talent agents.
In 1982, the legislature once again undertook the effort of revising
the Talent Agencies Act. One of the historical provisions of the various
employment agency acts still surviving in 1982 was the potential for mis-
demeanor punishment, in addition to civil liability, for violations of the
law. The peril created by exposure to criminal liability was abhorrent to
managers, and the 1982 amendments tentatively eliminated criminal pen-
alties. 6 The 1982 revisions also specifically authorized unlicensed per-
sons to work in conjunction with licensed talent agents in efforts to
procure employment for artists.3 7 At the same time, the statutes im-
panelled a blue-ribbon entertainment commission which, by 1985, was to
make recommendations to the Governor and the legislature regarding all
changes necessary to make the Talent Agencies Act a model bill.3"
The 1982 changes had "sunset" provisions, declaring expiration of
the revisions by their own terms in 1985. 39 Eventually, the sunset provi-
sions applicable to both the Commission and the temporary revisions to
the Talent Agencies Act were extended until 1986.'
Significantly, the Commission was placed under the chair of the
then-serving Labor Commissioner. In addition to the Labor Commis-
sioner, the California Entertainment Commission was composed of nine
political appointees. Three talent agent representatives, three personal
manager representatives, and three artist representatives were selected.
35. See, e.g., McFadden v. Ripp, No. SF MP 71, TAC 7-80, determination and award filed
Dec. 18, 1980; St. Louis v. Wolfhead Productions, Inc., No. SF MP 57, TAC 29-79, determi-
nation and award filed April 27, 1981.
36. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b) (West 1990).
37. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d) (West 1990).
38. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1701-1704 (West 1990).
39. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West 1990).
40. 1984 CAL. STAT. 553.
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Pursuant to its enabling statute, the Commission studied the laws and
practices of California, New York, and other entertainment capitals of
the United States.
In December of 1985, the Commission issued recommendations on a
number of critical issues. The first issue addressed was whether a per-
sonal manager, or any other person, should be allowed, under any cir-
cumstances, to procure employment without a talent agency license. The
Commission considered this the "principal, and philosophically the most
difficult" issue before it.4" Regarding this issue, the Commission de-
clared it could find no clear legislative intent controlling the matter.42 Its
review of the 1978 Act revealed the original proposal to require a sepa-
rate license for all personal managers, regardless of whether they pro-
cured employment. As previously mentioned, that portion of the 1978
Act was deleted before final passage. The Commission would not con-
clude from this history that the legislature intended to exempt managers
from the talent agency regulation.
The Commission was informed that talent agencies increasingly
found themselves "in competition with personal managers and others in
seeking employment for clients."4" On the other hand, the Commission
was advised that personal managers, in the normal course of their profes-
sion, must engage in limited and incidental efforts to procure employ-
ment. The Commission considered, but ultimately rejected, various
alternatives that would have permitted incidental employment activities
similar to those permitted by New York."
Regarding the manager/agent conundrum, the Commission stated
that it had "attempted over many hours, and by diligent exploration and
analysis of alternatives, to find a common ground of compromise on
which an answer to this long-standing industry controversy could be for-
mulated, but without success."45 With this admission, and despite its
simultaneous declarations of having succeeded in formulating a model
act, the California Entertainment Commission acknowledged failure in
its most important mandate. The extent of this failure is revealed by the
Commission's finding on this issue, when compared with its finding on a
similar issue involving the limited recording contract exemption for mu-
sicians' personal managers who procure employment.46
41. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id. at 10-11.
45. Id. at 10.
46. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
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On the general exemption issue, the divided Commission declared:
[O]ne either is, or is not, licensed as a talent agent, and, if not
so licensed, one cannot expect to engage, with impunity, in any
activity relating to the services which a talent agent is licensed
to render. There can be no "sometimes" talent agent, just as
there can be no "sometimes" professional in any other licensed
field of endeavor."'
However, on the issue of whether personal managers in the music busi-
ness should be exempt from talent agency licensing requirements, the di-
vided Commission feebly attempted to reason that "[a] recording
contract is an employment contract of a different nature from those in
common usage in the industry involving personal services. The purpose
of the contract is to produce a permanent and repayable [sic] showcase of
the talents of the artist."48 How can such a "permanent and replayable
showcase" of the musician's talents be differentiated from, for example,
the "permanent and replayable showcase" of a film star's talents? Or of a
writer's talents? Or of an editor's talents? Or of a composer's talents?
Endorsing the limited musician's exemption, the Commission found
persuasive the very considerations it rejected on the general exemption
question:
Personal managers frequently contribute financial support for
the living and business expenses of entertainers. They may act
as a conduit between the artist and the recording company ....
The personal manager may become involved in travel arrange-
ments .... [T]he problems of attempting to license or other-
wise regulate this activity arise from the ambiguities,
intangibles and imprecisions of the activity.49
This reasoning was logical nonsense. Precisely the same arguments
relate to the personal managers' efforts on behalf of artists in every other
field of endeavor in the entertainment industry. The primary difference,
if the truth is acknowledged, was that managers were already entrenched
in the music recording industry, while talent agents were involved pri-
marily in booking their live performances. A decision was thus reached
whereby "typical" contracts, i.e., performance bookings, were not ex-
empt, but recording deals - in which agents were not usually involved
- were exempt.50 Compromises in logic of this sort were no basis upon
which to support a purported multi-state model.
47. Id. at 11-12.
48. Id. at 13-14.
49. Id. at 14.
50. Id
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Aside from these two logically inconsistent decisions by the En-
tertainment Commission, the report decided that "the industry would be
best served without the imposition of civil or criminal sanctions for viola-
tions of the Act."'" In so doing, the Commission made many enforce-
ment rights under the revised act quite questionable.5 2 In addition, the
recommendations of the Commission included a diminution of time in
which unlicensed talent agents could have their commission agreements
disgorged. Whereas the prior law permitted the disgorgement ab initio,
the new law imposed a one-year statute of limitations for disgorgement.
53
In shaping this so-called model law, the Entertainment Commission
made a statement in its report that may ultimately help to undermine
the constitutionality of the essential elements of the Talent Agencies Act.
The divided Commission was obviously searching for a compromise that
would preserve adequate regulation but, as discussed, carve out specified
exceptions and diminished exposure for violations. In rejecting the con-
tinuation of criminal penalties, the Commission stated:
There is, however, an inherent inequity - and some question
of constitutional due process - in subjecting one to criminal
sanctions for the violation of a law which is so unclear and am-
biguous as to leave reasonable persons in doubt about the
meaning of the language or whether a violation has occurred.
"Procure employment" is just such a phrase. 54
The Commission further reported:
The majority of the Commission believes that the existing civil
remedies, which are available by legal action in the civil courts,
to anyone who has been injured by breach of the Act, are suffi-
cient to serve the purposes of deterring violations of the Act
51. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
52. Eventually, it took a test case and novel usage of "unfair competition" provisions of
the California Business and Professions Code in order to demonstrate continued vitality to the
enforcement aspects of the Talent Agencies Act. In the test case, the District Attorney for the
County of Los Angeles was enlisted to claim a violation of section 17200 of the Business and
Professions Code against a management firm which allegedly was engaged in procuring em-
ployment. The District Attorney sought a judicial injunction pursuant to sections 17202,
17203, 17204, 17535 and 17536 of the Business and Professions Code. This matter never pro-
ceeded to trial or appeal, thus making its usage of the "unfair competition" statutes of limited
significance. In this case, a Stipulated Final Judgment issued an injunction from violating the
Talent Agencies Act. No monetary or other penalties were issued. See, People v. Joseph and
Rix Management, Inc., No. C747627 (Los Angeles Superior Court, final judgment filed De-
cember 19, 1989). It should be borne in mind that these enforcement provisions are separate
from those in which the Labor Commissioner may void commission entitlements, which pow-
ers still exist but with a one year statute of limitations relating to disgorgement.
53. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c) (West 1990).
54. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15-16.
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and punishing breaches. These remedies include actions for
breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, interference with business opportunity, defamation,
infliction of emotional distress and the like .... Perhaps the
most effective weapon... is the power of the Labor Commis-
sioner.., to ... declare any contract... void... and order...
restitution.55
The Entertainment Commission rejected the proposal that personal
managers should be separately licensed and regulated.56 It reasoned that
the law does not license "a person" but the "activity of procuring em-
ployment.""7 Yet the historical record makes it clear that the original
purpose of the employment agency acts was to regulate rampant wrong-
doing. The regulation was intended to curtail improper activities, not to
punish innocent persons working in good faith. In California, however,
technical license violations may defeat contractual entitlements, and the
current rules permit the Labor Commissioner to abrogate otherwise per-
fectly proper agreements between artists and managers merely because of
failure to register for licensing.
It is important to remember that the California talent agency licens-
ing procedure is perfunctory: there is no test of competence, as may exist
for attorneys, accountants, realtors, doctors, teachers and the like. Any-
one without a significant criminal history, having good references, a local
address and an ability to provide a small bond is eligible for the license.
Is this an adequate and rational methodology by which to regulate an
industry that generates billions of dollars? Should such regulation be ap-
plicable without differentiation between managers and agents?
The blue-ribbon Entertainment Commission's own admission is that
the term "procuring employment" is inherently vague and ambiguous,
and therefore cannot support criminal penalties without violating due
process. Can such a regulatory scheme premised upon such an ambigu-
ous phrase therefore be sufficient to disenfranchise significant property
and contract rights, as is currently assumed by the Labor Commissioner?
The Commission supported a change in the law by which contracts
that met certain requirements and contained arbitration provisions
would not be subject to the Labor Commissioner's hearing process, as
long as the Commissioner was advised of all arbitration proceedings and
had a right to attend. This revision was part of a continued move away
from the Labor Commissioner's actual jurisdiction over talent agency
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id at 20.
57. Id.
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disputes, since those contracts now generally include boiler-plate arbitra-
tion language that meets the relevant criteria. Thus, the Labor Commis-
sioner's current jurisdiction predictably will focus more on the
unlicensed dispute areas - disputes between artists and personal manag-
ers - which may often lead to the avoidance of the management
contracts.
Are personal managers, as a class, so pernicious as to require this
type of treatment as a matter of policy, even if the law survives due pro-
cess and equal protection challenges? The entertainment industry con-
tains many examples of managers who have invested in their clients in
terms of their costumes, travel expenses, living expenses, showcases,
equipment, headshots, publicity expenses and so on. These investments
fuel the entertainment industry just as effectively as the agents' efforts to
obtain live performances or film roles. The manager's return on these
capital and time investments is much less certain than the return on the
efforts of large talent agencies that handle established talent. Also
caught in the regulatory crunch are the smaller talent agencies, which are
effectively "capped" at the ten percent commissions set by the large un-
ions, but which also act, in effect, as the old "Artists' Managers" by pro-
viding advice and counsel to the limited number of their less established
clients.
The entertainment industry labor unions have enormous power to
ensure the proper conduct of people who deal with their members. At
the same time, these unions often place contractual limitations on the
maximum commissions talent agents may charge their members and on
the length of contractual terms. Union concern for membership is an-
other complication in the adequate effectiveness of the revision in the
Talent Agencies Act. The current law which theoretically permits agents
to work in conjunction with managers in procuring employment is prac-
tically limited by union arrangements. Since the union commission caps
may be non-waivable, an agent and manager working together could ar-
guably be limited to an aggregate ten percent commission. 8
The issue of regulated compensation highlights differences between
New York and California laws, which eventually should be reconciled.
While New York permits "incidental employment procurement activi-
ties," it also statutorily regulates the commissions which may be charged
to artists.59 In California, the legislature has left the commission limita-
tions almost entirely to unions. Although the Talent Agencies Act re-
58. See e.g. SAG Rule 16(g).
59. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 171.8 & 185.8; Lane, supra note 5, at 21.
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quires contracts to be approved by the Labor Commissioner, the
Commissioner has not attempted to limit commissions within the range
of the New York statutory limitations.' °
Over the last two decades, the giant talent agencies have become the
inheritors of the demised studio system. These agencies have emerged as
a dominant force in the film industry, in part by packaging productions
for their client lists, which include stars, directors, screenwriters and
other creative talent. In respect to the creative talent, the power of these
agencies has now surpassed that of the studios themselves. Although the
financing, production and distribution power of the studios is unsur-
passed, the current environment includes the use of agency heads to ad-
vise multinational conglomerates seeking to purchase film studios and
film libraries.6" Surely the power of the talent agencies and the unions is
sufficient to ensure that managers are required to adhere to acceptable
limitations, while at the same time enabling them to receive their legiti-
mate entitlements.
Any ultimate solution to the agent/manager regulatory problem and
any truly model multi-state regulatory code will eventually require the
cooperation of lawmakers in California and New York, as well as the
reasonable cooperation of the leaders of the Screen Actors' Guild
("SAG"), the American Guild of Variety Artists ("AGVA"), the Ameri-
can Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA"), the Actors'
Equity Association ("Equity"), the American Federation of Musicians
("AF of M"), and other unions. It will also require the reasonableness of
the giant talent agencies, such as William Morris, CAA and ICM, and
leading personal managers and entertainment lawyers. This kind of co-
operation may be more than a realist can expect. However, enlightened
self-interest should motivate all involved. As for the California legisla-
ture, it has repeatedly tried to solve this problem and it may be assumed
that it will enact a model bill if the principal combatants permit them to
do the right thing.
THE CURRENT CALIFORNIA CHALLENGE
The essential findings of the California Entertainment Commission
were adopted by the legislature in 1986.62 While one cannot fault the
60. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 419; CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23 and 1700.24.
61. See Honan, 4 Agents Switch Allegiance To Rival, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at B-i,
particularly including the discussion of the role played by Creative Artists Agency head
Michael S. Ovitz in the $6.13 billion acquisition of MCA, Inc. by Matsushita Electrical Indus-
trial Company.
62. 1986 CAL. STAT. 488.
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sincerity of its efforts in reaching conclusions to difficult questions of
enormous economic consequence (and subject to enormous lobbying ef-
forts), the revised law simply did not accomplish the assigned task.
Although the revisions are less than five years old, the recent changes in
the regulatory scheme have not solved its antecedent problems. Argua-
bly, the changes themselves have revealed the defects more clearly, and
created new defects. This law has been ripe for challenge for some time.
A formidable legal challenge often occurs only if a dispute involving
a significant amount of money arises. Only if substantial interests are
involved are the stakes high enough to make trial and appeal a realistic
course. Many managers fear the pursuit of claims against artists for
commissions, due to technical violations of the Talent Agencies Act,
even if those violations have little to do with the success of the parties
and do not involve notions of malum in se.
Two recently filed companion cases resulting from the relationship
between entertainer Arsenio Hall and his former manager, Robert
Wachs, may cause talent agents, managers and entertainment unions to
reconsider their parochial positions, if only to avoid potential judicial
invalidation of principal portions of the current Talent Agencies Act.63
Both lawsuits were filed by noted lawyer Howard Weitzman on behalf of
New York attorney Robert Wachs and his California management com-
pany, X Management, Inc."'
In his actions, Wachs has sued James Curry, the Acting California
Labor Commissioner; Ron Rinaldi, California's Director of Industrial
Relations; and the California Department of Industrial Relations.
Wachs has used these complaints to attack Arsenio Hall's 1990 Petition
to Determine Controversy, 65 in which Hall has sought to determine that
X Management acted as an unlicensed talent agency by procuring and
attempting to procure employment for Hall. Hall's Petition to the Labor
Commissioner therefore sought to obtain a disgorgement of all monies
received by X Management related to Hall's entertainment industry
activities.
The Wachs complaints focus on two critical elements of the Talent
Agencies Act. The first is the definition of a Talent Agency in Labor
Code section 1700.4(a), which uses the Entertainment Commission's
63. See Wachs v. Curry, No. BC018803 (Los Angeles Superior Court, filed January 10,
1991); see federal companion case, Wachs v. Curry, No. 91 0148 JGD(Sx) (C.D. Cal., filed
January 10, 1991).
64. Wachs is a California resident, President of X Management, Inc., and, according to
the complaints, owns half of the stock of X Management, Inc.
65. Hall v. X Management, Inc., No. TAC 19-90 (filed August 8, 1990).
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questioned term "procure employment."66 The second is the licensing
requirement for agencies that "engage in or carry on the occupation of a
talent agency," as set forth in Labor Code section 1700.5.67 These ambi-
guities have long been the subject of criticism by concerned
commentators.68
The Wachs suits are seeking respective declarations by the state and
federal courts to the effect that the cited Labor Code sections, both on
their face and as applied, violate constitutional due process and equal
protection rights, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and by article I, section 7 of the California
Constitution.
Wachs contends that the statutory language is unconstitutionally
vague in that, inter alia, it does not sufficiently provide fair warning of
the type of conduct constituting procurement of employment, and it does
not provide an adequate standard for the Labor Commissioner to apply
in determining whether a personal manager has complied with the licens-
ing requirement. Wachs specifically argues that the terms "procuring,
offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engage-
ments for an artist" are so vague that one must guess at their meaning
and suspected application. Wachs also claims there is no rational basis
for a statute that exempts persons who procure "recording contracts"
but that restricts persons who procure employment for artists in other
media. In the federal case, Wachs also utilizes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988
to claim a deprivation of his civil rights. 69 Both cases seek temporary
and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of California Labor
Code sections 1700.4(a) and 1700.5.71
Whether or not these suits prevail in obtaining the permanent in-
junction of the enforcement of the critical regulatory and licensing ele-
ments of the Talent Agencies Act, a complete overhaul of the Act is long
overdue.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE LAW
1. Despite the obvious and continuing problems in the Revised
66. See Wachs v. Curry, State Complaint, at 7-8, paragraphs 23 and 28; see Federal Com-
plaint, at 7-8, paragraphs 21 and 26.
67. See Wachs v. Curry, State Complaint, at 6, paragraphs 17 and 18; see Federal Com-
plaint, at 5-6, paragraphs 15 and 16.
68. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 2, at 386-89; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, at 15-16.
69. Wachs v. Curry, Federal Complaint, at 2, paragraph 1.
70. See Wachs v. Curry, State Complaint, at 7-9, paragraphs 21, 26 and 30; see Federal
Complaint, at 7-9, paragraphs 19, 24 and 29.
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Talent Agencies Act, regulation of talent agents should clearly be contin-
ued. However, this regulation should be more meaningful. The en-
tertainment industry is one in which a talent agent's "deal memos" may
incur commitments of millions of dollars. Entire studios may be bought
and sold by multi-national corporations relying on a talent agent's ad-
vice. A profession of such stature and significance should be subject to
meaningful regulation and licensing, including more telling background
checks and the inception of practical skills testing. Since the true pur-
pose of regulation is to insure that artists are not disadvantaged by im-
proper behavior, talent agents should adopt, be familiar with, and be
tested on codes of ethical conduct. Particular care should be given to the
compromises inherent in the packaging of creative projects and talent, as
well as in the representation of clients with competing interests. Since
agents are regularly required to review proposed contracts, independent
counsel should be used to review agreements which deviate from indus-
try approved forms.
2. Personal managers also should be subject to licensing and regu-
lations that impose certain limitations on commissions, review of legal
documents and conflicts of interest. An adequate ethics code must be
adopted so that industry standards are codified and understood, and can
thus be properly applied. Given the nature of managers' selective efforts
and business, provisions must be made permitting some projects with cli-
ents in which managers wish to act as principals, producers, promoters
and the like. In such cases, the ethics and regulatory codes should be
clear in requiring that unfair, overreaching and oppressive agreements be
avoided. At the same time, agreements with fair and reasonable terms, in
accordance with the standards to be adopted, should be encouraged. To
the extent that incidental employment procurement occurs, a practical
statutory definition must be achieved that differentiates between the oc-
cupation of booking talent and the occupation of managing talent. This
definition should be drawn, to the extent possible, in conjunction with
New York lawmakers and, if possible, it should be uniform between the
two key states.
3. Management companies and major labor unions should attempt
to negotiate overall agreements and franchise arrangements that reflect
the particular contributions and needs of personal managers, while insur-
ing that union members are not subject to overreaching management
contracts. The unions must be cognizant of the liberal needs of personal
managers to engage in more flexible business relations with members, but
still recognize boundaries that prevent betrayal of loyalties. Managers
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should not be precluded from flexible business relations, as long as the
terms are fair and equitable.
4. The Labor Commissioner should be removed from the typical
dispute resolutions relating to talent agents and personal managers. The
regulation of these professions should be moved into the Business and
Professions Code or the Civil Code. Resolution of disputes should be
encouraged within the framework of that Code, arbitration agreements,
and laws of general application.
5. Arbitration proceedings should be favored for all disputes in-
volving artists in their agreements with agents and managers. Unlike the
Labor Commissioner's rulings, arbitration proceedings are not generally
subject to de novo review, thus serving the purposes of judicial economy
and economy to the parties. Another advantage of arbitration proceed-
ings is that, unlike the Labor Commissioner's decisions which are not
published in an accessible codified form for easy public scrutiny, they
would begin to develop a body of law upon which artists, agents, manag-
ers, unions and attorneys could rely. The current procedures provide
little precedential value or professional guidance. Arbitration proceed-
ings would periodically result in confirmation challenges in the superior
court, while non-arbitrable matters would be litigated there. Skills test-
ing of agents and managers could specifically require familiarity with the
reported body of law. This proposal would be particularly helpful if leg-
islation established a publication and reporting system for all industry
arbitration decisions.
CONCLUSION
California's Talent Agencies Act does not adequately regulate the
realities of the contemporary entertainment industry. The present laws
woefully fail to meet the legislative goal of a model, multi-jurisdictional
statute. The most obvious problem involves the murky regulation of per-
sonal managers and others involved in incidental activities intended to
assist in procuring employment for artists.
Personal managers are valued professionals involved in all aspects of
the entertainment industry. The profession deserves a legal status, defini-
tion, and recognition that guarantee the fair fruits of the personal man-
ager's labors. In turn, personal managers must be willing to accept
statutory regulation, certain commission caps, specific codes of conduct
and union franchise agreements as a reasonable price for the ability to
enter into fair and enforceable business relations with their clients. Until
such changes are made, California's personal managers will remain
alone, which does not leave them in good company.
1991]

